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‘I Went with What I Always do…’: A Qualitative Analysis of ‘Cleggmania’ and Vote 
Choice in the 2010 British General Election 
Edzia Carvalho1 and KristiWinters2* 
Abstract 
We use focus group transcripts from the innovative Qualitative Election Study of Britain 
dataset to provide insights into why ‘Cleggmania’ failed to translate into electoral success for 
the Liberal Democrats in 2010. Analyses conducted on participants’ vote choice stories 
indicate the effect of ‘Cleggmania’ was limited to strengthening the resolve of wavering 
Liberal Democrats. Long-time Labour and Conservative supporters who leaned Liberal 
Democrat before the election found their latent party identification made voting for a different 
party psychologically uncomfortable. Qualitative electoral research can advance our 
understanding of people’s voting calculus by analysing narratives for values, identity, utility 
maximizing, and constituency dynamics. 
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2 
3 
After campaign polls put their support as high as 31%, the Liberal Democrats1 failed to 
increase their electoral vote share and seats in Westminster substantively on election day 2010 
(BBC 2010b). Using narrative and discourse analyses on the Qualitative Election Study of 
Britain (QESB) dataset we differentiate between those who cited a pre-election vote choice 
dilemma or not and those who, post-election, cited partisanship or strategic considerations in 
their vote choice. Through this typology we will show where Cleggmania succeeded and 
failed in converting individual support into Lib Dem votes. Our dilemma/partisanship 
structure identifies the values and identity-based accounts of stable voters who ‘started loyal 
and stayed loyal’, unaffected by Cleggmania. We reveal the psychological obstacles of 
undecided voters with prior party identities who ‘dated Nick but didn’t stick’ with him and the 
narratives of undecided voters who were ‘won over’ to the Lib Dems.2 Our second group 
includes three types of strategic voters: people who maximized their Lib Dem vote for either 
tactical, satisficing, or principle/policy reasons. 
This study makes two methodological contributions to electoral research. First we employ a 
unique data source: the transcripts of the 2010 QESB’s focus groups conducted across Britain 
pre- and post-election.3 This required innovation in data analysis; thus the second contribution 
is applying traditional qualitative analysis methods to British political behaviour.  We address 
a gap in elections research by adding the missing piece: qualitative analysis. We will 
demonstrate that valuable insights, such as tactical voting motivations, can be discovered 
using qualitative approaches. 
1
 Henceforth, the Lib Dems. 
2
 This category pays homage to the 2004 US Democratic primary’s ‘Dated Dean, Married Kerry’. 
3
 The 2010 QESB is the only academically designed and publically available qualitative panel research 
conducted in England, Scotland, and Wales during the UK national election. 
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We provide a background to the 2010 election, including the first-ever leaders’ debates 
broadcasts. We then review explanations for the gap between the Lib Dems’ buoyant pre-
election support and their disappointing electoral performance. The second section explains 
our data and methods of analysis and the findings from our narrative and discourse analyses, 
highlighting participants’ vote calculus. Finally, we triangulate our findings with the current 
attempts to explain the failure of Cleggmania. This research follows up on Helena Catt’s 
(1996) challenge to the ‘orthodoxy of British electoral research’ and demonstrates that 
qualitative electoral data can provide invaluable insights into voting behaviour by questioning 
the assumptions and inferences made by experts and academics on why ordinary people vote 
as they do and shedding new light on the effect of partisanship and contextual factors such as 
constituency dynamics on vote choice. We conclude that research into QESB participants’ 
narratives reveal a complex calculus in vote choice that has not been recognized or examined 
adequately by quantitative electoral analysis. We recommend the use of qualitative research, 
in particular to better understand how voters think about their votes given their constituency 
dynamics.   
 
Setting the scene: the campaign and debates  
The election saw the first televised debates between the three major party leaders in Britain.4 
David Cameron was expected to win in the debates given his background in public relations 
and greater ease in front of the camera in comparison with Gordon Brown. Nick Clegg was 
the relatively-unknown leader of the Liberal Democrats with his rhetoric of ‘change’ aimed at 
a populace disenchanted with British politics and politicians (BBC, 2010a; Blitz, 2010; 
                                                 
4
 Each debate focused on specific themes in the first half – domestic affairs, foreign policy and the economy – 
and general issues in the second. The leaders responded to questions and also to each other, and a moderator 
chaired the proceedings. There was significant anticipation for the ‘Prime Ministerial’ debates, one held each 
week in the three weeks preceding polling day (Allen et al, 2011). For the history of the leaders’ debates and 
televised debates, see inter alia Hook and Hitchens, 2010. 
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Greenslade, 2010; The Telegraph, 2010).5 Tension in the campaigns was increased by the 
possibility of the first hung parliament since 1974, an outcome that 32 percent of voters 
favoured before the debates (White, 2010).6  
 
The Lib Dems began the 2010 general election with 62 parliamentary seats having won 22% 
of the vote in 2005, the strongest Parliamentary presence since their Liberal Party predecessor 
in 1923 (Mellows-Facer, 2006: 13).  In 2007 Clegg was elected party leader on a ‘change’ 
agenda directed at the two-party system. He aimed to widen the party’s appeal to those voters 
with ‘liberal values’ but who did not vote Lib Dem (BBC, 2007). The party’s response to the 
2008 financial crisis and its lack of involvement in the 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal 
shored up its credibility (BBC, 2010c). When the election campaign was launched on 6 April 
2010, 17-21% of respondents expressed a Lib Dem vote preference (Populus, 2010; YouGov, 
2010). However, Clegg’s obscurity vanished overnight. The morning after the first debate the 
London media was dominated by the neologism ‘Cleggmania’ (inter alia: Hasan, 2010; 
Mayer, 2010; Sabloff, 2010).    
 
Turning point: Cleggmania 
Approximately 9.7 million people watched the first debate (Wring and Ward, 2010). Clegg 
had a strong first debate. His ‘polished performance’ helped him connect with voters 
unfamiliar with him and he positioned his party as a ‘viable alternative to the “old parties”’ 
(Quinn and Clements, 2011: 82; Wring, 2011: 2). Clegg’s criticisms of the two major parties 
struck a positive chord with the respondents polled by Ipsos MORI (Allen et al, 2011: 189). 
He came across as trustworthy and the leader who gave the least evasive answers (Lawes and 
                                                 
5
 In a survey taken before the first debate around 44% believed David Cameron would perform best in the 
debates (only 13% predicted that of Nick Clegg) (Curtice, 2010). 
6
 For a view of the role of hung parliaments in Britain before the 2010 coalition government see Kalitowski 
(2008). 
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Hawkins, 2011: 68-70).  QESB focus groups were conducted before and after each of the 
three debates.  The transcripts captured QESB participants’ reactions in real time. 7 
Participants reported positive reactions to Clegg’s precision in answering the questions and 
his polished first debate performance. Excerpt 1 contains the real-time reactions that we 
identify as driving ‘Cleggmania’ (Winters, 2011).8 
 
Excerpt 19 
David: I felt the two people who had more gravitas were Gordon Brown and Cameron 
yet Nick Clegg seemed to have all the answers. He knew how he was going to pay 
things off. You know they were talking about deficits, this, that, and the other. They 
seemed to have worked out the budget, how they were going to afford this whereas 
Labour and Conservative weren’t disclosing that.  
(Later) 
Patricia: Actually I was really surprised about Nick Clegg. I thought he was the one 
who actually answered the questions more than anyone else did. He actually positively 
came out with what he was going to do, the numbers etc., whereas Cameron, really I 
was really looking forward to hearing him and he really disappointed me. I was very 
surprised. 
Jane: I’m glad you said that ‘cause that was something I had forgotten but yes, he 
[Clegg] was definitely much more focused on the person who had asked the question 
and the question they had actually asked rather than just using it as an excuse to kind 
of say ‘ah, this is lovely but let me talk about health reform.’…. 
 
                                                 
7
 Participants did not watch post-debate coverage; therefore, we are confident their reactions are free from media 
effects. QESB transcripts are available at: Winters, 2011. 
8
 Most participants were undecided at the time of the debate. 
9
 Participant details are anonymised. Conventions used: ** inaudible words, italic font word guessed at, curly 
brackets {} sounds (e.g. laughter), and parentheses () breaks in time. 
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Clegg transformed the Lib Dems into serious contenders in the eyes of the major parties, the 
media and potential voters. 10 Lib Dem support rose from 17% to 31% (Lawes and Hawkins, 
2011: 68) and there was speculation that they might overtake Labour as the main opposition 
party (Deacon and Wring, 2011: 287). This unprecedented boost was called the ‘Clegg effect’ 
or ‘Cleggmania’. It increased expectations for the Lib Dems’ electoral performance, 
presuming that the sections of the electorate enthused by the campaign would vote for them in 
unexpectedly large numbers (Allen et al, 2011: 197).  
 
This unexpected occurrence changed the Conservative and Labour strategy in subsequent 
debates. Allen et al document that, ‘Brown and Cameron had ignored Clegg in the first debate 
but turned their fire on him in the second and third debates’ (2013: 110). Although Cameron 
and Brown criticized the Lib Dems only hesitantly in the first debate (viewing them as 
irrelevant and/or potential coalition partners), Cameron became more critical of their policies 
while Brown employed a two-pronged approach: being complimentary whilst arguing that Lib 
Dem supporters should vote tactically for Labour (Allen et al, 2011: 189-93). Clegg’s third 
debate performance was seen as repetitive and ‘tired’ and Cameron was judged the winner by 
a small but distinct margin (ibid: 195). By the end of the campaign nine British Polling 
Council (BPC) polls reported that 26-29% of respondents stated a Lib Dem vote preference 
(Atkinson and Mortimore, 2011: 78).  
 
The dilemma: Why did Cleggmania fail to convert support to votes? 
The election results were disappointing for the Lib Dems; they won 23% of the vote, one 
point better than their 2005 share (ibid). The BPC polls (excluding the three internet surveys) 
had overestimated the party’s vote share by an average of 3.6% points (Kellner et al, 2011: 
                                                 
10
 Comparisons were made between Clegg and Che Guevara, Sir Winston Churchill and Barack Obama 
(Burkeman, 2010; Oliver and Smith, 2010). 
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95). Three accounts have been provided thus far to explain why Cleggmania failed to live up 
to expectations. The first posits ‘the polls got it wrong’, either because they measured support 
that did not exist or failed to measure declining support (ibid: 78, 81-91). The second account 
points to an over-emphasis of the leaders’ debates effect while ignoring constraining factors 
such as the limited number of viable Lib Dem seats; this prevented translating a bounce into 
seats (Allen et al, 2011; Johnston and Pattie, 2011a). Johnston and Pattie (2011a) showed the 
Lib Dems’ constituency disadvantage: fewer marginal seats ‘in play’ and fewer resources to 
retain their marginal seats. The Lib Dems could only win 16 additional seats (lost in previous 
elections by less than five percent). It was not enough to make them national contenders. The 
authors conclude that Cleggmania did not help the Lib Dems win marginal seats because the 
party’s pre-election planning was to retain seats won in the previous election (ibid: 224-225, 
232). When Cleggmania emerged they did not have a ground apparatus to transform new 
supporters into new voters. 
 
A third account focuses on a lack of persuadable voters. Lawes and Hawkins (2011: 66-68) 
argue the initial Lib Dem surge was rooted in an unstable coalition of respondents whose 
allegiance the party was unable to widen or consolidate. ComRes polls that tracked party 
support and voter preferences showed that although expressed voting intention for the Lib 
Dems rose from 21% before the first leaders’ debate to 27% before the third one, the party 
was unable to capture the increased bastions of support or retain them after the first debate. 
Analysis of party support by pre-debate voting intention showed that over three-fourths of 
respondents who expressed allegiance to specific parties continued to support them after each 
debate. Additional support for the Lib Dems came largely from the remaining one-fourth of 
supporters of the two major parties and a third of supporters of smaller parties. Similarly 
Allen et al (2011: 198) suggest that most voters would have decided their vote choice before 
watching the debates and Cleggmania could plausibly have affected only a small section of 
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voters.11 They suggest the apparent first debate surge could ‘well have been an artefact of 
media-priming effects and the tendency for people to say they would vote for the party whose 
leader they had been told had won the debate’. The Lib Dems received the same three- to 
four-point campaign bounce in 2010 as they had in general election campaigns since 1997 
(ibid). By this account, the leaders’ debates and campaign had no greater or lesser effect on 
Lib Dem support than prior campaigns.  
 
Justification: Our data and methods 
Several of the above accounts rely upon the inferences of experts or academics’ assumptions 
of what voters perceived or intended.12 Our approach to the Cleggmania puzzle uses evidence 
other accounts do not incorporate: the perceptions and self-reports of voters themselves. This 
allows both the cognitive and affective aspects of vote choice, often described in the values 
and norms of partisan identification, to emerge from the data. Partisan identification, as 
summarized by Burden (2008), is a combination of ‘affect and cognition’ (p. 60). This 
combines the Butler and Stokes’ (1969, 1974) view that partisan identification represents an 
affective bond between voters and parties with research that highlighted the cognitive 
component of partisan identification (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1977; Lodge and Hamill, 1986).13  
 
The use of pre- and post-election focus group data is unique in the extant British vote choice 
literature. Our approach has implications for the hypothesized effects of ‘voter characteristics’ 
on the cost-benefit calculations of vote choice and the propensity for voters to vote sincerely 
                                                 
11
 In 2010, 43% of respondents reported making up their minds during the campaign, higher than the reported 
figure for the 2005 election. For voters interested in the debates, Allen et al (2011: 198) claim the leaders did not 
offer clear substantive policy messages that simplified vote choice. Moreover, barring the first debate, there were 
‘no knockout blows’ that produced a clear winner. 
12
 Indeed, as Catt’s critique suggests, the tendency of researchers to “presume to ‘explain’ the reasoning of 
voters[,].... assume that [they] share the analysts’ own ‘objective’ recognition of the true position[,]….seem 
unwilling to believe the voters[,.... or be] condescending in their acceptance of voters’ views” continues almost 
two decades later (1996: 32-33). 
13
 See also Campbell et al for a view of partisan identification as ‘the individual’s affective orientation to an 
important group-object in his environment,’ (1960, p. 121). 
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or strategically (Kedar, 2012: 551-552). We redress this methodological gap in British 
electoral research by using qualitative data and methods to make visible people’s particular 
vote choice dilemmas, partisan identification, strategic voting, and the  norms and values 
voters draw upon as we explore Cleggmania’s impact (or not) on QESB voters. Qualitative 
data allows researchers to examine the British election as self-reflexively understood by the 
participants. The QESB provides high-quality pre- and post-election panel data to analyze 
‘how people use language in their everyday interactions, their ‘discourses’ with each other, 
and how they…put their linguistic skills to use in building specific accounts of events’ (Burr, 
2003: 17).  We examined the post-election transcripts from focus groups conducted between 
18 and 24 May 2010 in England (Essex and London), Scotland (Glasgow) and Wales 
(Aberystwyth) for participants’ vote choice stories and related asides.14 During the focus 
groups participants were invited to recount the lead up to election day and if, and for whom 
they voted.15  Focus groups are not as in-depth as one-on-one interviews but they facilitate the 
gathering of rich data from many people (in this case 30 voters from across Britain).16 Such 
data lends itself to thematic organization and we applied narrative analysis and discourse 
analysis to the stories, respectively.17  
 
We believe that the data produced through the QESB is methodologically valid (i.e. our data 
and findings represent something in the world accurately). Our working assumption for this 
research was that participants knew how they had voted and they would construct their stories 
both to recount and to explain (justify) their actions. Our analysis makes visible the narrative 
                                                 
14
 76 participants took part in 14 pre- and post-election focus groups. Participants were recruited through email 
advertising and snowballing referrals and screened by age, sex, and voting intention to ensure the sample was 
representative on these criteria. Most pre-election participants were undecided voters. 40 people participated in 
the post-election groups, 30 of whom voted. In this article, we analyse only these post-election focus groups as 
they provide us with the data needed to examine participants’ vote choice.  
15
 Vote choice reporting was voluntarily as ethical principles preclude requiring someone to reveal the content of 
their secret ballot. 
16
 For more on construction of the QESB research design see (Winters and Carvalho, forthcoming) 
17
 Qualitative analysis processes data iteratively, bringing out information in each new wave until reaching 
theoretical saturation and ‘…further coding, enrichment of categories, and so on no longer provide or promise 
new knowledge’ (Flick, 2009: 312). 
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structure of people’s stories and the values, norms, or ideas they cited; the analysis aggregates 
these factors to see how they interact. The analysis is not vertical (insights into one person), 
but rather horizontal (norms and values common across people). We seek, not to capture one 
participant’s vote choice thought process perfectly, but rather the common values and norms 
Britons draw upon to communicate their vote choice. An analogy could be, if someone were 
to relate a poker game story, he might not convey all the details perfectly but his account will 
reflect the accepted rules and values of the game.  Which parts he focuses on - bluffing, tells, 
‘upping the ante’ - reveals how he understands the game. If he relates something in 
contradiction to that discourse he will appear to others to not understand how poker is played.  
 
Given this, we propose two possible approaches to this data: a charitable view and a sceptical 
view. The charitable view, which we adhere to, would see these data as more or less reflecting 
participants’ sincerely held views, stipulating both social desirability and people’s tendency 
for cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957).18 A sceptical view would see the data as 
constructed accounts that do not accurately reflect people’s prior thought-processes or views. 
In both cases, the narratives remain attempts to communicate one’s attitudes and actions in a 
way others would find rational and convincing (even if that person voted for a different 
party). Even taking up a sceptical view of these narratives, it must still be acknowledged that 
the participants drew upon the shared political norms and values of British democracy in their 
accounts. Our analysis, therefore, was constructed to find the broader patterns in the values 
and norms across stories of participants within different constituency dynamics, holding 
different partisan identifications, and from three nations.19  
  
                                                 
18
 Cognitive dissonance is the unpleasant feeling that comes when our beliefs, decisions, and actions are 
inconsistent.  
19
 In doing so, we take into account the ‘choice, constraints, and context’ relevant to our participants’ voting 
behaviour (Lupia et al, 2000). 
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In the first wave of analyzing the post-election transcripts, we did a close reading of each vote 
choice story using narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is a holistic approach that preserves 
the context and particularity of the data (Riessman, 1993). Stories have a narrative order that 
describe a tension or an unexpected event that requires reaction and/or adjustment (Riessman, 
2008).20 People’s stories draw upon their subjective experiences and provide insights into 
their concepts of identity and self (Smith, 2000). Narrative analysis examines how the story-
teller interprets things (Bruner, 1990).  The QESB vote choice stories contained elements of 
the dramatic arc and plus additional ones.21 We identified the following narrative elements: 
 
i) Scene setting: narrative introduction/background;  
ii) Dilemma: a dilemma or complicating factor;  
iii) Turning point: event(s) important to heighten/ resolve the dilemma(s); 
iv) Resolution: dilemma’s resolution;  
v) Justification: explanations or rationalization;  
vi) Outcome: the final outcome;  
vii) Reflections: further thoughts; 
viii) Coda: a short restatement (may include a verbal link to the past or present). 
 
We re-read the transcripts to identify the temporal ordering of events and logical coherence in 
30 vote choice stories and identified elements within each, for example:22 
Original text: 
                                                 
20
 Franzosi (1998: 521) notes ‘[T]he temporal ordering of events in a story is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the emergence of a story. The events in the sequence must be bound together by some principles of 
logical coherence’. 
21
 Introduction/Exposition - main characters and scene are set; Inciting incident - problem or conflict is 
introduced; Rising Action - intensity increases; Climax - Turning point, the situations changes; Falling action - 
difficulties are confronted and overcome; Resolution/Denouement - remaining issues are reconciled (MacEwan, 
1900; Ohler, 2008). 
22
 Not all narratives contain each element listed and some include the same element multiple times. 
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Diane: I didn’t know who I was going to vote for. I liked the Lib Dems and thought -is 
it going to be a wasted vote?  Then I saw the debate, which was here, and that made up 
my mind really who I did want to vote for which was Lib Dem… 
 
Narrative analysis applied: 
Diane: [Dilemma] I didn’t know who I was going to vote for. [Dilemma] I liked the 
Lib Dems and thought -is it going to be a wasted vote?  [Turning point] Then I saw 
the debate, which was here, [Resolution] and that made up my mind really who I did 
want to vote for which was Lib Dem … 
 
We then undertook a close reading of the stories and characterized each element’s content 
using a form of discourse analysis. Guided by Gee’s (2008: 9-13) principles of discourse 
analysis, we analyzed how participants used language to make things significant (or not); to 
enact identities; the social goods they communicated; and how they (dis)connected ideas or 
things to make them relevant or irrelevant to each other. The individual elements were often 
coded in vivo, leaving the original wording to retain specific values, rationales and 
justifications while remaining sensitive to common themes across stories.23 This is an 
example of the finished coding:  
 
Diane: [Dilemma: Undecided] I didn’t know who I was going to vote for. [Dilemma: 
A wasted vote?] I liked the Lib Dems and thought -is it going to be a wasted vote?  
[Turning point: Saw debate] Then I saw the debate, which was here, [Resolution: 
Will vote Lib Dem] and that made up my mind really who I did want to vote for 
which was Lib Dem…  
                                                 
23
 In vivo codes use the language of respondents to preserve a particular meaning and/or the significance in a 
setting (Gibbs and Taylor, 2010).  
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As we were interested in what the tellers were communicating the narratives were examined 
for patterns in the story structures and value themes.24 In this fourth wave of data analysis 
distinct themes emerged: pre-election vote choice dilemmas (yes or no) and post-election 
explanations that included partisanship or not. Using a deductive approach this becomes a 2 x 
2 pre-election dilemma and post-election partisanship frame (Table 1).25 Four types emerged 
from inductive analysis but not in the categories deductive reasoning would predict.26 
Conforming to prediction, participants without a pre-election vote choice dilemma and cited 
partisanship post-election as their justification for voting are labelled ‘Stayed loyal’. There 
were no stories observed in the ‘no dilemma, no partisanship’ category most likely due to the 
exclusion of non-voters at the recruitment stage. Those who had a dilemma but remained 
loyal to their identification are labelled ‘Dated Nick, didn’t stick’ voters. Inductive data 
methods indicate two distinct narrative structures in the stories of people who had a dilemma 
and did not cite partisanship in their account: those who were ‘won over’ to the Lib Dems and 
those who voted for them for strategic (rather than partisan identification) reasons. We review 
these in turn. 
 
  
                                                 
24
 We call an individual’s unanalyzed account ‘a (vote choice) story’, we use ‘narrative structure’ when referring 
to the coded version. 
25
 Alternatively, if this were principle-components analysis, we would expect a four factor solution that captures 
the underlying latent concepts. Our thanks to the two anonymous reviewers for helping us further clarify this 
typology. 
26
 The remaining narratives were assigned the category ‘Other’ and were excluded from the analysis. Individuals 
who reported not voting were excluded and one undecided participant who voted Conservative for policy 
reasons, although he would fit within ‘principle/policy’. One participant who voted Lib Dem because ‘everyone 
else was doing it’ was excluded.  
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Table 1: Partisanship/dilemma types 
Dilemma (pre)  No Yes 
Partisanship (post) 
Yes 1. Stayed loyal 2. Dated Nick, didn’t stick 
No 
(Unobserved) 3a) Won over  
3b) Strategic voters: Tactical, 
Satisfying, Policy/Principle 
 
Outcome: the narratives’ types 
1. Stayed loyal 
Some participants knew how they would vote before the election started.  The QESB data 
included 8 such participants: two Labour, two Conservative, two Lib Dem, one Green, and 
one Plaid Cymru. We include examples in Excerpt 2. The coded narrative structures are listed 
in Table 2.27   
 
Excerpt 2 
John (Labour):28 I voted first in ’79 which was Labour, which was influenced through 
a trade unionist father really and then there was Thatcher of course {laughing} which 
can only strengthen my convictions and that’s the way it’s been ever since. So I 
walked in knowing full well where I was going.  
Jody (Conservative):29 And there was absolutely no way I was going to vote Labour 
and so I voted Conservative. That was the party I was going to vote for, always, you 
know.  
                                                 
27
 Only selected excerpts are included; full transcripts are available online. 
28
 Essex Post 1. (Winters, 2011). 
29
 Essex Post 2. (Winters, 2011). 
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Helen (Lib Dem):30 Well it was kind of easy for me because in my constituency we’ve 
had a Lib Dem majority for years and years - it’s Ed Davey – and he won again and 
he’s done some good work in our constituency so it was easy for me. 
 
Table 2 ‘Stayed loyal’ narrative structures. 
John 
(Lab) 
O: Knew who to vote for, Ss: Personal history, J: Trade unionist 
family, J: Thatcher, J: Labour ever since, C: Walked in knowing 
 
Geoff 
(Lab) 
O: Voted Labour, J: Labour from start 
 
 
Jody 
(Con) 
J: Brown’s failings, J: Waste in public sector, Ss: No way vote Labour, 
O: Voted Con, J: Always going to vote Con 
 
Anthony 
(Con) 
O: Voted Tory, J: Tory supporter, Ss: No problem to put the ‘X’, J: 
Campaigned for them 
 
George 
(PC) 
J: Support my country, J: Policies I agree with, J: Looking after 
vulnerable,  O: It didn’t go our way  
 
Rita 
(Green) 
Ss: Green involvement, O: Vote Green, J: Shift in politics, J: Seems 
more positive 
 
Helen 
(LD) 
Ss: Was easy for me, J: Lib Dem majority, J: MP did good work, C: 
Easy for me 
 
Andrea 
(LD) 
O: Voted Lib Dem, Ss: Never wavered, D: Tired after work, seat so 
safe, a wasted vote? C: But I voted 
 
Source: [Winters, 2011]. Codes: Ss: Scene setting; D: Dilemma; J: Justification; O: Outcome; 
C: Coda.  
 
Conservative and Labour voters’ personal history or values (‘a trade unionist father’, ‘support 
my country’, ‘seems more positive’) are cited in their explanations of vote choice. These 
themes of personal values and identity are also found in the ‘Dated Nick’ respondents’ 
justifications for returning to their prior party, the difference being that ‘Stayed Loyal’ voters 
never considered voting for another party. The Lib Dem voters in this category provide 
different justifications from other partisans. They do not cite values or identity, but instead 
                                                 
30
 London Post. (Winters, 2011). 
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mention constituency dynamics in their narratives. Across all the post-election vote choice 
stories we examined, Lib Dem narratives were the most likely to feature constituency 
dynamics. 
 
2. Dated Nick, didn’t stick 
Five voters, two prior Labour voters and three Conservative voters, were undecided at the pre-
election focus groups. They considered voting Lib Dem, but ultimately voted for their usual 
party. We provide excerpts and the narrative structures. 
 
Excerpt 3 
Roger (Labour):31 There’s elements of my situation which mirror the same sort of 
pattern in that it was a decision between Labour and the Liberal Party and as a long-
term Labour voter I wasn’t used to having to face a decision on that course so much…. 
I ended up choosing Labour…  And it really came down to, literally, the ballot box 
and it came to the point of ‘How will I feel when I see the results come in’?   
Cathy (Conservative):32 Although I was undecided when it came to the focus group, I 
had thought possibly, I’d always voted Conservative and I thought probably would do 
that again but I could have been swayed….I liked Nick Clegg on all of the debates, I 
watched all of them, and I live in a really strong Conservative constituency and I knew 
they’d get in again and when it came down to it and I went to put my cross in the box I 
looked at Lib Dem and I looked at Conservative  and I went with what I always do 
which is Conservative  because I just couldn’t, I don’t know, just something in me was 
just like ‘I’ve always voted that way’ and probably will always continue to.   
                                                 
31
 London Post. (Winters, 2011). 
32
 Essex Post 1. (Winters, 2011). 
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Shirley (Conservative):33 Yeah, I was going to go with the Lib Dems actually. My 
family have always been Tory and I’ve always gone with what they were, and I 
thought I’d go for the Lib Dems, give them a chance sort of thing… but on the day I 
thought- they’re never going to get in.  So I waited for my husband to get home, we 
both went and I still wasn’t sure, and we got there and the Tory guys were outside, so I 
walked up and put my cross straight away, and - Tories. In the end, yeah I thought I 
don’t think they’re going to do it so I’ll just vote Tory.  
 
Table 3 ‘Dated Nick, didn’t stick’ narrative structures 
Ida 
(Lab) 
 
D: Lab / LD, O: Voted Labour, J: My preferred party 
 
Roger 
(Lab) 
Ss: Lab / LD, D: Not used to decisions, O: Voted Labour, Tp: How will 
I feel? 
 
Cathy 
(Con)  
D: Undecided, Ss: Always voted Con, D: Could have been swayed, D: 
Liked Clegg, D: Strong Con constituency, D: Had to decide, O: Voted 
Con, J: Always voted that way 
 
Shirley 
(Con) 
Ss: Was going to vote LD, Ss: Family Tory, Ss: Always voted Tory, Ss: 
Give LD a chance, Tp: LD won’t get in, Tp: Tory guys outside, O: 
Voted Con, Res: LD won’t do it, I’ll vote Tory 
 
Patricia 
(Con) 
Ss: Open-minded, Ss: Clegg good in debate, D: Lost confidence in 
Clegg, Res: Examine leaders, J: Gordon had his chance J: Went for best 
leader 
 
Source: [Winters, 2011]. Codes: Ss: Scene setting; D: Dilemma; Tp: Turning Point; Res: 
Resolution; J: Justification; O: Outcome. 
 
  
In contrast to the ‘Stayed Loyal’ voters, these stories relate psychological dilemmas and their 
resolutions. They start with setting scenes or the dilemma of being undecided. Two voters 
report this tension extended late into the campaign: Roger and Shirley report being undecided 
as they walked up to/into the voting booth. Important insights are found in voters’ 
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justifications. Participants relate emotional explanations (‘How will I feel when I see the 
results come in?’) and the desire for cognitive consistency (‘I just couldn’t, I don’t know, just 
something in me was just like “I’ve always voted that way”’). These voters resolved their 
psychological dilemmas by remaining cognitively consistent and returning to their party of 
long-term identification.34 From this we conclude that the partisan identity of the participants 
overrode reasons to vote Lib Dem.   
 
These data provide direct evidence for a new account explaining the over-estimation of Lib 
Dem support in the polls: some people may have sincerely thought they would vote Lib Dem 
and then could not. Shirley and Roger are examples of people who, if surveyed, could have 
reported a Lib Dem voting intention on the day of the election. Yet when confronted with the 
act of voting both cast their votes for the party they had always supported. We consider this 
key evidence and another piece of the Cleggmania puzzle. Our analysis suggests that voting 
carries a unique psychological weight that cannot be captured in pre-election survey 
questionnaires or laboratory experiments but can be identified using qualitative research. This 
explanation could be retroactively applied to the phenomenon known as the ‘spiral of silence’ 
or ‘shy Tories’ that has been used to account for why pollsters got the results of the 1992 
general election wrong (see Jowell et al, 1993). Survey research has explained the reason for 
the polls misjudging Tory support as a failure on the part of voters who went for the 
Conservative party in that election to reveal their true vote preference to the pollsters. 
However, our analysis of Cleggmania suggests that these voters could have given sincere 
preferences at the time and then behaved differently on polling day.  
 
                                                 
34
 These participants, as do those who voted strategically, highlight the importance of taking into account the 
extent to which a voter can ‘live with’ her voting decision in addition to the national issues, party contests, and 
constituency dynamics (Catt, 1996: 45). 
20 
 
Next we take up the two types of vote choice narratives that emerged from participants who 
had a pre-election dilemma but did not give a partisanship explanation for their Lib Dem vote.  
These people were either ‘won over’ to the Lib Dems or had strategic considerations. 
 
3a. Won over  
The ‘Won Over’ voters’ narratives mirror ‘Dated Nick’ voters except in their justifications. 
‘Won Over’ voters do not report the cognitive dissonance dilemmas seen above. Instead they 
cite their agreement with Lib Dem principles and/or being impressed with Nick Clegg. Two 
participants mention the debates as turning points in their decision-making; two others cite 
constituency dynamics. Worries about casting a wasted vote or their vote not meaning much 
also featured in these stories. These voters were ‘won over’ in that something overcame their 
‘wasted vote’ concerns to vote Lib Dem. 
 
Excerpt 4 
Nicole:35 I still hadn’t really decided until I turned up at the polling station, but I voted 
for the Liberal Democrats and I live in a very, very safe Tory seat.  So I really knew 
my vote wasn’t going to mean very much but I agree with their principles, I like the 
candidate I just wanted to show my support and just place the vote where I wanted it 
even though I knew it wouldn’t do anything.  
Diane:36 I didn’t know who I was going to vote for. I liked the Lib Dems and thought -
is it going to be a wasted vote?  Then I saw the debate, which was here, and that made 
up my mind really who I did want to vote for which was Lib Dem.  
 
Table 4 ‘Won over’ narrative structures 
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Nicole 
(LD) 
D: Undecided, O: Voted LD, Ss: Safe Tory seat, D: Vote won’t mean 
much, J: Agreed with LD principles, J: Liked Clegg, J: Show of support 
 
Diane 
(LD) 
D: Undecided, D: Wasted vote? Tp: Leaders’ debate, Res: Made up my 
mind, O: Voted LD 
 
Stacey 
(LD) 
D: Undecided, Ss: Not Tories, Tp: Leader’ debate, Tp: Impressed with 
Clegg, Ss: Considered Labour, J: Constituency dynamics, O: Voted LD, 
Ref: Didn’t make a difference 
 
Ian 
(LD) 
O: Voted LD, J: I agreed with them, J: Not Brown, J: Dad’s influence, J: 
Not Cameron 
 
Nathan 
(LD) 
O: Voted LD, Ss: Happy about debates, J: Disillusioned, J: Not Labour 
or Tories, J: LD hype, Tp: Could vote and not waste it 
 
Source: [Winters, 2011]. Codes: Ss: Scene setting; D: Dilemma; Tp: Turning Point; Res: 
Resolution; J: Justification; O: Outcome. 
 
We conclude that the debates and Cleggmania shored up support with these wavering and 
leaning voters. That the Lib Dems increased their 2010 vote share by one point may be down 
to Cleggmania converting such wavering and leaning supporters into votes.  
 
3b. Strategic voters  
‘Strategic’ voters are unique in that these voters consider the costs and benefits given their 
constituency dynamics. Their structured stories assume the norm of voting as an act that 
maximizes their personal views or a politically preferable outcome.37 Johnston and Pattie 
(2011b) examined 2010 BES data for tactical voting given local contexts. They conclude (in 
part) that people voted tactically if their preferred party attachments were relatively weak, if 
they had confidence in their second-preference party, and where they thought it could win. 
Our findings map onto some of their conclusions, but provide richer voting calculus data 
rather than inferences drawn from statistical patterns.38 Our analysis revealed multiple 
                                                 
37
 In political science, most rational choice theory has focused on whether or not the act of voting is ‘rational’ 
(Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). 
38
 Johnston and Pattie’s (2011b) analysis focused on tactical voters. Their first dataset was composed of BES 
self-reported tactical voters (using a question on vote choice reasons) plus a second dataset comparing the party 
that respondents listed as first on an AV ballot against the party they reported voted for.  
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motivations for the same act of tactical voting and we feel an important contribution is its 
differentiation between three types of strategic voters: 1) tactical: voted Lib Dem to stop 
another party from winning, 2) satisficing: preferred a marginal party, but voted Lib Dem to 
support a viable and still political proximal party, and 3) principle/policy: express support for 
electoral reform or a policy (usually proportional representation).The first two fit neatly into 
the quantitative conclusion of Johnston and Pattie (2011b), the third does not.   
 
Excerpt 5 
Tactical voter 
Kevin:39 I voted Lib Dem to keep the Tories out.  Never again in my life-time, I’ll 
never vote Lib Dem again.  I’ve cut off my nose to spite my face; they’ll never get my 
vote ever again.  
 
Satisficing voters 
Harry:40 Well, I was thinking of voting Lib Dem and then because mainly I think their 
manifesto agreed with my ideals most and then there was some thoughts of you know, 
who would be best for Scotland, possibly the SNP would be but I think after looking at 
the statistics for our constituency, it’s a Labour stronghold and pretty much Labour are 
going to get it and I thought the Lib Dems, overall, fitted me more. Then I thought, 
you know it’s not going to count in my constituency but they’re going for PR.  
Matthew:41 No, but I did [vote Lib Dem] not for it being the first choice but by 
deciding the others I didn’t want - given the choice I’d have voted Green but that was 
a wasted vote because that wasn’t going to get me anywhere.  I grew up under 
Thatcher so I’ve never voted Conservative and I didn’t want Gordon Brown in again, 
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so I was left with the Lib Dems.  They were the closest I would have got to some of 
the Green views.  
 
Principle/policy voter 
Lyle:42 Yeah. I voted for kind of the same reason as Alice like I was a more a strategic 
voter, because I knew like, I thought the Lib Dems would have a better chance of 
having a long-term impact.  And I mean like they’re more for proportional 
representation I’m trying, so I’m basically looking at the long term to see where my 
vote is going.   
 
Table 5a ‘Tactical’ narrative structures 
Kevin 
(LD) 
O: Voted LD, J: Tories out, Ref: Never again 
 
 
David 
(LD) 
O: Voted LD, J: LD landslide, Ref: Regret, Ref: Tactical vote 
misjudged, J: Didn’t want Labour in, J: But not a Con majority 
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Table 5b ‘Satisficing’ narrative structures 
Harry 
(LD) 
Ss: Maybe vote LD, J: Manifesto agreed, D: Best for Scotland, Tp: 
Labour stronghold, J: LD fitted more, J: My vote won’t count, J: LD 
going for PR 
 
Matthew 
(LD) 
O: Voted LD, J: Process of elimination, Ss: Wanted Green, J: A wasted 
vote? J: Not Tories, J: Not Brown, Res: Left with LD, J: Closest to 
Green  
 
Arthur 
(LD) 
O: Voted LD, J: Agreed with policies the most, J: Leftish and PR 
Heather 
(LD) 
Ss: Set on voting LD, Ss: Had voted SNP, D: Couldn’t see the point, 
Tp: LD moment, J: Polls, Ss: Internet research, D: Should vote Green, 
D: No Green / Socialist options, Res: Stuck with LD 
 
 
Table 5c ‘Principle/policy’ narrative structures 
Peter 
(LD) 
D: Vote or not? J: Unfair system, Tp: Something might happen, Res: 
Vote LD, J: Good MP, J: Closest to my politics, J: Change unfair 
system, C: Pushed me to vote 
 
Lyle 
(LD) 
J: I was a strategic voter, J: Better long-term impact, J: More for PR, C: 
Long term impact 
 
Keith 
(LD) 
O: Voted LD, Ref: Strategic alliance, J: LD want 3-party system, J: 
Voted for 3-party system, J: Voted for an ideal 
 
Source: [Winters, 2011]. Codes: Ss: Scene setting; D: Dilemma; Tp: Turning Point; Res: 
Resolution; J: Justification; O: Outcome; Ref: Reflections; C: Coda. 
 
Two people voted tactically (against the Conservatives rather than) for the Lib Dems, a 
decision both came to regret given the coalition government.  ‘Satisficers’ (as per Johnston 
and Pattie, 2011b) report voting Lib Dems as they were politically viable and political 
proximal to their views although they preferred or held another party identification. The third 
group cited a policy or principle as their justification. Why classify these voters as strategic 
instead of expressive? The evidence is in the stories themselves. Unlike strong partisans who 
express their views through their identity, these voters describe their vote as part of a strategic 
goal. As Keith says, ‘I definitely want to see Labour in again in my lifetime… [the Lib Dems] 
want to get a 3-party system going… I didn’t vote for a short-term government I voted for a 
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chance of some sort of ideal.’43 Peter also indicated he valued a systemic change: ‘…what 
concerned me and had concerned me for a long time is, the unfairness of the system, we have 
this two-party system.’44 Lyle too, speaks of his long-term perspective on the use of his vote: 
‘I thought the Lib-Dems would have a better chance of having a long-term impact… even 
though you shouldn’t vote strategically I think that by voting for the Liberal Democrats, at 
least in the future you won’t possibly have to vote strategically.’45 We would argue there is a 
qualitative difference between voting as an expression of values at that moment and seeing 
one’s vote as a movement in a larger political plan to bring about institutional change. Our 
understanding is this is a distinct set of values based in strategic goal-seeking that contrasts 
with expressive values of partisan post-election or ‘Won Over’ voters’ justifications. 
 
Reflections and Coda 
The televised leaders’ debates debuted to fanfare and, by most accounts, provided a public 
platform for the ‘third party’ to introduce its policies and leader to the British public. The 
hype surrounding Cleggmania reached unprecedented heights following the first debate 
(Lawes and Hawkins, 2011: 68). The failure of the Lib Dems to transform their electoral 
prospects into electoral success left many people befuddled. The QESB transcripts and our 
analysis shed new light on this puzzle by illuminating how Cleggmania operated in the 
thoughts and calculations of ordinary voters.  
 
As to the validity of our findings we seek to meet the criteria of Riessman (1993: 65-8) in 
terms of persuasiveness - the data and our analysis are persuasive; correspondence - the 
theories we produce match the data; and usefulness - our findings can be useful to future 
research. Further, we can triangulate our conclusions to augment the other accounts of 
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Cleggmania’s failure. The first explanation was a survey-based account of why Cleggmania 
failed to produce expected results: ‘the polls got it wrong’ either because they measured 
support that did not exist or failed to measure a decline in support (Atkinson and Mortimore, 
2011: 78).  Our results provide insight into the psychological obstacle of voting for another 
party given a previous partisan identification. Our evidence-based account suggests there 
were people who considered voting Lib Dem but when faced with the ballot found it difficult 
to vote against their traditional party. A portion of the 3.6% error in the pre-election polls may 
have been down to people honestly reporting a Lib Dem vote intention in a survey but then 
did not (or could not) follow through in the voting booth. The psychological elements of 
voting may also explain why voters who didn’t profess a vote preference for the Tories in the 
1992 general election ended up voting for them. Contrary to accepted explanations that these 
voters were ‘shy’ or ‘silent’ about expressing who they would vote for, our analysis of ‘dated 
Nick’ voters suggests that long-term partisans who sincerely profess an undecided status or 
who lean toward a different party in a survey cannot be assumed to follow through on that 
declaration when faced with casting their ballot, either by not voting or voting for another 
party. 
 
The next account in the literature cited an over-emphasis on the effect of the leaders’ debates 
by the media while ignoring the limited number of viable seats Lib Dems could win (Allen et 
al, 2011; Johnston and Pattie, 2011a; Lawes and Hawkins, 2011). We found extensive 
evidence that constituency dynamics played an important role in people’s vote decision. Of 
the 30 vote stories we analyzed, 17 include constituency dynamics in the narrative.  The 
evidence provides rich, context-informed insight into constituency considerations, such as 
where parties are concentrated or the number of marginal seats ‘in play’ (Atkinson and 
Mortimore, 2011; Johnston and Pattie, 2011a). QESB participants detail how they made 
decisions within the confines of their own constituency dynamics.  For instance, those who 
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expressed a strong partisanship were unlikely to mention ‘wasted’ votes. The vote choice 
stories that most often contextualized constituency dynamics and/or cited concerns about a 
wasted vote were those of Lib Dem voters. These complex and constrained calculations 
cannot be captured by a one-size-fits-all vote choice model using survey data. We recommend 
that future qualitative research projects be undertaken to better understand constituency level 
dynamics and its impact on the voting calculus.   
 
The last account cited a lack of persuadable voters available to the Lib Dems. Lawes and 
Hawkins (2011: 66-8) argued the initial Lib Dem surge was rooted in an unstable coalition of 
respondents whose allegiance the party was unable to widen or consolidate. Our analyses 
identified several participants for whom the debates and Cleggmania shored up their wavering 
support and converted them into ‘won over’ voters. Lawes and Hawkins (ibid) also described 
support for the Lib Dems as coming from supporters of each of the two major parties and 
supporters from smaller parties. We add to this account by identifying the vote choice stories 
of strategic, satisficing, and principle/policy voters who saw a vote for the Lib Dems as a way 
to maximize their utility on a personal level.  Further, we saw the Lib Dems unable to 
convince long-time Labour and Conservative participants to abandon their party identification 
at the ballot box.   
 
Our analysis also provides a response to a hypothesis proposed by Kedar (2012: 551-2) 
concerning the factors that affect strategic voting and this has implications for measuring 
tactical voting in the British Election Study. We find evidence in support of the proposition 
that partisans are less likely to vote strategically. However, our analysis of the ‘Stayed loyal’ 
voters highlights important variation in how voters of different parties speak about party 
identification. Conservative, Labour, and small party voters were more likely to justify their 
choice by citing their values than Lib Dem voters. We suggest the British Election Study (and 
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future research) investigate the proposition that different parties shape partisan identity 
differently. The ‘dated Nick’ voters suggest that while they may initially be open to vote for 
another party, their prior party identification makes the psychological cost of casting a vote 
that violates their previous identity quite high. Further, we also observed that non-partisans 
can be ‘won over’ and can vote sincerely for a party. 
 
If partisans are less likely to vote strategically then by logical necessity non-partisans are 
more likely to vote strategically. In partial agreement with Johnston and Pattie (2011b), we 
find evidence that ‘strategic voters’ did not divulge any strong party identification and were 
undecided before the election. The QESB strategic voters worked to keep another party out 
and voted for more viable parties that were political proximal; however there is evidence that 
three voters placed their votes tactically to express a desire for institutional change. Therefore, 
our second suggestion for the British Election Study is to formulate survey questions that can 
examine the vote choices with the specific aim of uncovering underlying values, norms, and 
factors that affect the multiple constructions of sincere and strategic voting. 
 
Qualitative research provides the space and human interactions that enable, as we argue, more 
complete and accurate insights into complicated vote choice calculations. High-quality 
qualitative electoral data and applying rigorous methods of analysis allowed us to identify 
new answers to the Cleggmania puzzle that are grounded in the evidence of real voters’ 
stories. Although these individual stories cannot be generalized they have the benefit of being 
direct evidence rather than expert inferences about what might have happened.  Finally, the 
thought processes of average people cannot be captured in survey data or through the artificial 
setting of a laboratory where simulated voting does not carry the same commitment as an 
actual vote in a real election. We recommend an expanded use of qualitative analysis in 
conjunction with quantitative and experimental research to triangulate British electoral 
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behaviour research. As we have demonstrated, a key component in understanding people’s 
vote choices is to let them speak in their own words. 
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